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  The Right to Strike: The Supreme Court of Canada,  
 The Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Arc of Workplace Justice  
    Judy Fudge and Heather Jenson  
 
1.Introduction  
 In momentous decision, released on 30 January 2015, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled 
in Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v. Saskatchewan (SFL)1 that the right to strike is 
protected by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom¶VJXDUDQWHHRIIUHHGRPRIDVVRFLDWLRQ
Writing for the majority (5:2), Justice Abella asserted:  
 The conclusion that the right to strike is an essential part of a meaningful    
 collective bargaining process in our system of labour relations is supported by   
 KLVWRU\E\MXULVSUXGHQFHDQGE\&DQDGD
VLQWHUQDWLRQDOREOLJDWLRQV«7KHULJKWWR 
 strike is not merely derivative of collective bargaining, it is an indispensable   
 component of that right. It seems to me to be the time to give this conclusion   
 constitutional benediction.2   
The case is significant QRWRQO\IRUWKH&RXUW¶VFRQFOXVLRQthat the freedom of associate protected 
in s. 2(d) of the Canadian Charter includes the right to strike, but also because it signalled that 
the gradual expansion of the scope of constitutional protection for labour rights that began in 
2001 with Dunmore,3 had not been reversed in 2011 in Fraser.4 In fact, Justice Abella began her 
judgment in SFL by remarking WKDWµFOHDUO\WKHDUFEHQGVincreasingly towards workplace 
MXVWLFH¶5  
 The crucial issue before the Court was the constitutionality of provincial legislation that 
unilaterally designated public sector workers as essential and prohibited them from striking. The 
legislation did not provide a process for an independent tribunal to review whether or not the 
                                                     
1
 Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v Saskatchewan, 2015 SCC 4 (SFL). 
2
 SFL, para. 3 
3
 Dunmore v Ontario (Attorney General), [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016 (Dunmore) granted constitutional 
protection to such collective activities as making collective representations to an employer. 
4
  In Attorney General of Ontario v Fraser, 2011 SCC 20 (Fraser) the Court refused to extend the 
collective bargaining legislation that pertained to most private sector employees to agricultural workers. 
See Judy )XGJHµ&RQVWLWXWLRQDO5LJKWV&ROOHFWLYH%DUJDLQLQJDQGWKH6XSUHPH&RXUWRI&DQDGD5HWUHDW
DQG5HYHUVDOLQWKH)UDVHU&DVH¶11) 41 Indus LJ 23. 
5
 SFL, para. 1.  
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work performed by the designated workers was in fact necessary to prevent danger to life, health 
and safety. Nor did it provide a meaningful process for resolving collective bargaining disputes 
that went to impasse. The question the Court had to resolve was whether or not strike action was 
an essential part of collective bargaining. Concluding that the right to strike was a 
constitutionally protected component of collective bargaining, Justice Abella recognised that 
protecting health and safety was a legitimate and pressing objective that could justify limiting the 
scope of freedom of association. Nonetheless she held that the provincial government had failed 
WRHVWDEOLVKWKDWWKHPHDQVLWDGRSWHGWRDFKLHYHWKLVJRDOZHUHµPLQLPDOO\LPSDLULQJ¶RIWKH
constitutional right. 
 Even more remarkable than the result, ZDVWKH&RXUW¶VDSSURDFKWRLQWHUSUHting the scope 
of freedom of association. It referred to the history of labour relations and collective bargaining 
law in Canada, canvassed the gamut of international and comparative law regarding the status of 
the right to strike, and reviewed its own jurisprudence to conclude that the right to strike was a 
constitutionally protected component of collective bargaining. -XVWLFH$EHOOD¶VVRXUFHVranged 
IURPWKH(XURSHDQ&RXUWRI+XPDQ5LJKW¶VSDWKEUHDNLQJGHFLVLRQLQDemir and Baykara, 
through international human and labour rights, to Anatole )UDQFH¶VµDSKRULVWLFIDOODF\¶µThe law, 
in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the 
VWUHHWVDQGWRVWHDOEUHDG¶6  
 In what follows, we will first explain the facts that gave rise to SFL decision and then we 
will situate the case in the relevant jurisprudence. :HZLOOEULHIO\GLVFXVVWKHPDMRULW\¶V
reasoning for extending the constitutional protection of freedom of associate to include the right 
to strike. Then we will consider three implications of the 6XSUHPH&RXUWRI&DQDGD¶VUHDVRQLQJ
in SFL: first, the what the PDMRULW\¶VUHDVRQVLQGLFDWHDERXWKRZLQWHUQDWLRQDOKXPDQULJKWVLQ
JHQHUDODQGWKH,/2¶VVXSHUYLVRU\ERGLHVREVHUYDWLRQVLQSDUWLFXODUZLOOILJXUHLn future cases 
about the scope of constitutional protected associational activities; second, the scope of the 
constitutional protections for the right to strike; and third, the constitutionality of the revised 
essential services legislation that the Saskatchewan introduced in response to  the Supreme 
&RXUW¶VUXOLQJWKDWWKHLQLWLDOOHJLVODWLRQZDVXQFRQVWLWXWLRQDO. To conclude, we will reflect upon 
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what constitutional recognition means for the Canadian labour movement in particular and 
unions more generally 
 
2. Essential Services Legislation Comes to Saskatchewan  
 Until 2008, the province of Saskatchewan, which historically has had a strong social 
democratic party that frequently formed the government, was the only jurisdiction in Canada that 
did not have comprehensive legislation to preserve the delivery of essential public services 
during strikes and lockouts.7 Instead, provincial governments had used ad hoc back-to-work 
legislation in response to individual disputes that had a politically unacceptable effect. The 
Saskatchewan Party, a right of centre populist provincial political party that formed a majority 
government for the first time in 2007, was electHGRQDSODWIRUPWKDWLQFOXGHGµUHEDODQFLQJ¶ 
labour legislation in the province. Pointing to a strike of corrections workers and snowplough 
operators in December 2006, the potential for strikes of health care workers, and a 2007 a strike 
of support staff at two universities, the Saskatchewan party and business groups argued essential 
services legislation was needed.8 In December 2007, the new government introduced The Public 
Service Essential Services Act (PSESA).  
 What distinguished the new Saskatchewan essential services legislation from public 
sector collective bargaining legislation in most other Canadian jurisdictions is that it did not 
provide a mechanism that enabled public sector unions to challenge the employer¶s designation 
of services as essential and have that challenge reviewed by an independent tribunal. In effect, 
The Public Service Essential Services Act (PSESA) mandated an essential services agreement 
and, failing agreement, allowed the employers to determine which and how many employees 
could participate in a strike.9  
 The PSESA came into effect in May 2008. It defined µessential services¶ broadly, to 
include any service provided by a public employer that prevents danger to life, health or safety, 
serious deterioration of machinery, equipment or premises, serious environmental damage or 
                                                     
7
 In Canada, jurisdiction over labour relations is divided between the provinces, which have authority to 
legislate regarding enterprises in their territories, except those undertakings and enterprises that are 
federally regulated, such as banks, shipping and railways, that fall within exclusive federal jurisdiction.  
8
 0DUN)HUJXVRQµ8QLRQVXJJHVWVKHDULQJVUHYLHZRISURSRVHGODERXUELOOV¶The Star Phoenix, February 
$6HHDOVR(PPD*UDQH\µ7LPHOLQH7KHEDWWOHRYHUHVVHQWLDOVHUYLFHV¶The Star Phoenix, 
October 16, 2015. 
9
 The Public Service Essential Services Act, SS 2008, c P-42.2 
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disruption to the courts. Public employers included the government, all publicly owned 
corporations, all public health service providers, universities and colleges, municipalities, police 
services, and any other prescribed employer, which included, among other enterprises, several 
casinos and most liquor stores in the province. The Act gave employers the authority to state 
which services qualified as essential. In the months leading up to the renegotiation of a collective 
agreement, the public employer was required to provide to the union a list of the services it 
considered to be essential, as well as the job classifications, number of employees in each 
classification, and names of individual employees who were required to work during a strike or 
lock-out. The Act then required the public employer and union to negotiate for the purposes of 
reaching an essential services agreement, which would identify the services to be maintained 
during a strike and the employees required to provide those services. The parties were prohibited 
from considering whether members of management or any other persons could provide the 
essential services during the job action.  If the union and employer did not agree, the employer 
was empowered to determine unilaterally what services were essential, how many persons in 
each job classification were required to continue working, and the names of the individual 
employees who were required to continue working and therefore, prohibited from participating 
in strike activity. Therefore, although the law required the parties to negotiate, the employer 
could impose its position at the end of the negotiation process. The review mechanism was 
limited; the Saskatchewan Labour Relations Board could review only the numbers of employees, 
EXWQRWWKHHPSOR\HU¶VGHFLVLRQVDERXWZKLFKVHUYLFHVZHUHHVVHQWLDOZKLFKFODVVLILFDWLRQVZHUH
required, or which employees must work. Employees designated as essential were prohibited 
from participating in a work stoppage against their employer, and individual employees and 
unions faced fines for each day an employee designated as essential participated in a work 
stoppage.   
 The Saskatchewan Federation of Labour (SFL), which is a provincial federation of trade 
unions with 37 affiliated union members representing 100,000 workers, launched a court 
challenge in July 2008, alleging that the PSESA YLRODWHGZRUNHUV¶IUHHGRPRIDVVRFLDWLRQ
assembly, expression, that the legislation deprived workers of liberty and security of the person, 
and that the legislation violated the guarantee to equal protection and benefit of the law.10 
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Eighteen individual unions, most of which were affiliates of the SFL, joined the SFL court 
challenge as plaintiffs. The same action also complained that several changes to The Trade 
Union Act violated workers¶ freedom of association and expression.11 A complaint about the 
effect of the PSESA on freedom of association was also sent to the International Labour 
Organization.12  
 In addition to the Saskatchewan Federation of Labour¶V court challenge, four individual 
unions started independent legal actions claiming the legislation violated their freedom of 
association as protected by the Charter.13 On the application RIWKH6)/WKH&RXUWRI4XHHQ¶s 
Bench stayed the four individual union challenges to the legislation, directed that the SFL action 
to proceed first, and granted intervener standing at the trial level to the four unions that brought 
separate challenges. The trial proceeded by affidavit, with hundreds of pages submitted 
documenting the effect of the PSESA on certain unions affiliated with the SFL, the intervening 
healthcare unions and public employers, and the opinions of several expert witnesses. The trial 
judge, Mr. Justice Ball, who had served as a Chair of the Saskatchewan Labour Relations Board 
before his appointment to the Court of Queen`s Bench, explained meaningful collective 
bargaining as requiring three interdependent elements: the right to organize and choose a 
bargaining representative; the right to bargain collectively with the employer through that 
representative; and the employees¶ right to strike.14 The trial judge determined that the Act 
µsubstantially interferes with the freedom of public sector employees in many workplaces to 
engage in meaningful strike action¶.15 In the absence of a fair and adequate alternate dispute 
resolution mechanism, or indeed any alternate dispute resolution mechanism, the trial judge 
decided the interference did not meet the proportionality standard required to justify a limitation 
on a Charter-protected right.16 
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 ,QDEULHIIRXUSDUDJUDSKVWKH&RXUWDJUHHGZLWKWKHWULDOMXGJHWKDWµDPHQGPHQWVWRWKHSURFHVVE\
which trade unions obtain (or lose) the status of bargaining representative . . . does not substantially 
LQWHUIHUHZLWKWKHIUHHGRPWRIUHHO\FUHDWHRUMRLQDVVRFLDWLRQ¶SFL, paras. 100, 99 ± 102.  We will not be 
discussing this aspect of the case.  
12
 Case No 2645 (2010). 
13
 The Saskatchewan Union of Nurses, the Saskatchewan *RYHUQPHQWDQG*HQHUDO(PSOR\HHV¶8QLRQ
Service Employees International Union West and the Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE) each 
brought legal actions challenging the constitutionality of the PSESA. 
14
 2012 SKQB 62, paras. 60 and 115. See also 2015 SCC 4, para. 24. 
15
 2012 SKQB 62, para. 122. 
16
 Ibid., paras. 217-222 
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 The Attorney General for Saskatchewan appealed the trial judge¶s decision to the 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal. At the provincial appeal court level, 21 provincial public sector 
unions and employers and the federal attorney general appeared as interveners. The 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal overturned the trial decision on the basis that there was Supreme 
Court of Canada precedent determining that freedom of association protected by s. 2(d) of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms does not include protection for the right to engage in 
strike activity.17  
 The SFL sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada on questions whether 
the PSESA and changes to The Trade Union Act infringed workers¶ freedom of expression or 
freedom of association, and if so, whether the infringement was a reasonable and justified limit 
on the freedom. The Court granted leave on November 22, 2013.18 At the Supreme Court of 
Canada five other provincial governments joined the already long list of interveners. 
  
3. The Trajectory of Freedom of Association Jurisprudence in the Labour Context 
 The SFL decision represents a 180-GHJUHHVKLIWLQ6XSUHPH&RXUWRI&DQDGD¶VDQVZHUWR
the question of whether or not the right to strike is protected by the Charter¶VJXDUDQWHHRI
freedom of association. In its three decisions interpreting the Charter¶VJXDUDQWHHRIfreedom of 
association, which were released simultaneously in 1987 and came to be known as the Labour 
Trilogy, a majority of the Supreme Court held that right to strike was not constitutionally 
protected.19 The main reasons were delivered in the Alberta Reference, a case involving 
compulsory arbitration to resolve impasses in collective bargaining and a prohibition on strikes 
in the public sector. The six justices participating in the case issued three separate sets of reasons, 
which demonstrated sharp disagreement over whether or not freedom of association included the 
right to strike and to bargain collectively. The Labour Trilogy established both the judicial fault 
lines and the repertoire of arguments that have reappeared in the subsequent decisions.20 
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 See SKCA, paras. 54, 66-68 referring to the Labour Trilogy, which is discussed in the next section.  
18
 See Supreme Court of Canada, Docket 35423, history of proceedings of SFL v Saskatchewan, online: 
<http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/case-dossier/info/dock-regi-eng.aspx?cas=35423>. 
19The Labour Trilogy refers to three concurrently released appeals: Reference re Public Service Alliance 
of Canada [1987] 1 S.C.R. 424 (PSAC) and RWDSU v. Saskatchewan, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 460 (RWDSU). 
20
 J )XGJHµ)UHHGRPRI$VVRFLDWLRQ¶LQ6WpSKDQH%HDXODFDQG(UURO0HQGHVHGVCanadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms (5th ed.) (LexisNexis, 2013) 527-562. 
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 Justice LeDain, whose reasons attracted the most support, gave the freedom of 
association a very restrictive interpretation; according to him, the freedom of association only 
HQFRPSDVVHGWKHIUHHGRPWRMRLQLQDVVRFLDWLRQIRUDFRPPRQSXUSRVHDQGWKHDVVRFLDWLRQ¶V
activities insofar as they represented the exercise of another fundamental or constitutionally 
protected right or freedom.21 Characterizing µthe modern rights to bargain collectively and to 
strike, involving correlative duties or oblLJDWLRQVUHVWLQJRQDQHPSOR\HU¶DVµWhe creation of 
OHJLVODWLRQ¶KHKHOGWKDWWKH\ZHUHµnot IXQGDPHQWDOULJKWVRUIUHHGRPV¶.22 Notably, LeDain J.  
did not refer to any international law regarding the freedom of associate and labour rights, 
despite the fact the unions bringing the constitutional challenge had made extensive reference to 
it in their facta and oral arguments.23 The final reason he offered for adopting a narrow 
interpretation of freedom of association in the context of labour relations was the need for 
judicial deference to the choices of the legislature. 
 In concurring reasons, Justice McIntyre J. agreed that the right to strike was not protected 
within the constitutional guarantee of freedom of association. Like Justice LeDain, he also 
ignored international law regarding the right to strike. However, he adopted a slightly broader 
approach than LeDain J., although he, too, was committed to state neutrality and deference. 
Justice McIntyre argued that the scope of freedom of association should include the protection of 
all activities pursued in association with others that a person could lawfully pursue as an 
individual.24 He began with the generally accepted proposition that at the core of freedom of 
association µrests a simple proposition: the attainment of individual goals, through the exercise of 
individual rights, is generally impossible without the aid and cooperation RIRWKHUV¶.25 But, from 
that premise he quickly moved to the much more controversial assertion that µ[i]f Charter 
protection is given to an association for its lawful acts and objects, then the Charter-protected 
rights of the association would exceed those of the individual merely by virtue of the fact of 
DVVRFLDWLRQ¶.26 He invoked the examples of gun and golf clubs to demonstrate how unacceptable 
                                                     
21Alberta Reference, 391, Beetz and La Forest JJ. concurred with Le Dain J. 
22
 Ibid., 391. 
23
 .(ZLQJDQG-+HQG\µ*LYLQJ/LIHWRWKH,/2± 7ZR&KHHUVIRUWKH6&&¶LQ))DUDGD\-)XGJHDQG(
Tucker, eds., Constitutional Labour Rights in Canada: Farm Workers and the Fraser Case (Irwin Law, 
286, 292-32011)  
24Alberta Reference, 407. This is sometimes called the equal protection approach. 
25
 Ibid., 395. 
26Ibid., 404.  
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it would be to protect the objects and activities of an association.27 Thus it was crucial for him to 
limit constitutional protection to those associative activities that only an individual could do 
lawfully.  
 Having set out his framework, McIntyre J. turned to trade unions and their core activities. 
$FFRUGLQJWRKLPVLQFHµ[m]odern labour relations legislation has so radically altered the legal 
relationship between employees and emSOR\HUVLQXQLRQL]HGLQGXVWULHV¶QRDQDORJ\µmay be 
drawn between the lawful actions of individual employees in ceasing to work and the lawful 
actions of union members in engaging in a stULNH¶.28 Thus, he concluded, µthat interpreting 
freedom of association to mean that every individual is free to do with others that which he is 
lawfullyentitled to do alone would not entail guaranteeing the right to strike¶.29 . 
 In his dissent in the Alberta Reference, Dickson C.J.C. adopted a purposive approach to 
interpreting freedom of association that was sensitive to the context of labour relations, 
emphasizing the distinctive nature of trade unions as public goods and the collective dimension 
of labour rights. According to him,  
 [t]he role of association has always been vital as a means of protecting the essential needs 
 and interests of working people. Throughout history, workers have associated to 
 overcome their vulnerability as individuals to the strength of their employers. The 
 capacity to bargain collectively has long been recognized as one of the integral and 
 primary functions of associations of working people. While trade unions also fulfill other 
 important social, political and charitable functions, collective bargaining remains vital to 
 the capacity of individual employees to participate in ensuring fair wages, health and 
 safety protections, and equitable and humane working conditions.30 
+HGLVDJUHHGZLWK0F,QW\UH-that constitutional protection should be limited to associational 
activities that only individuals could do lawfully sincHµthere will [be] occasions when no 
analogy involving individuals can be found for associational activity, or when a comparison 
between groups and individuals fails to capture the essence of a possible violation of 
DVVRFLDWLRQDOULJKWV¶.31 His characterization of the distinct, positive aspects of trade unions and 
                                                     
27









conclusion that it was crucial to interpret freedom of association to include some of the 
fundamental activities of trade unions.  
 Chief Justice Dickson found support for his purposive and contextual interpretation to the 
freedom of association in international law, stating WKDWLQWHUQDWLRQDOOHJDOQRUPVµprovide a 
relevant and persuasive source for interpretation of the provisions of the Charter, especially 
ZKHQWKH\DULVHRXWRI&DQDGD¶VLQWHUQDWLRQDOREOLJDWLRQV XQGHUKXPDQULJKWVFRQYHQWLRQV¶.32 Not 
RQO\GLGKHUHIHUWRWZRRIWKH8QLWHG1DWLRQV¶KXPDQULJKWVFRYHQDQWVZKLFK&DQDGDKDV
ratified, noting that both contained specific provisions relating to freedom of association and 
trade unions, he also mentioned the InternDWLRQDO/DERXU2UJDQL]DWLRQ¶VILO) Convention 87, 
regarding the freedom of association, and the observations of the ILO supervisory bodies relating 
the legislation that was the subject of the constitutional challenge.33 He remarked µthere is a clear 
consensus amongst the I.L.O. adjudicative bodies that Convention No. 87 goes beyond merely 
protecting the formation of labour unions and provides protection of their essential activities ² 
that is of collective bargaLQLQJDQGWKHIUHHGRPWRVWULNH¶.34 The Chief Justice concluded that 
collective bargaining and striking were essential if unions were to be able to attain their objects 
and thus were included under the freedom of association protected in the Charter.35  
 However, it is important to note that Dickson C.J. treated the right to strike as an essential 
element of collective bargaining, and it was for this reason that he considered strike activity to be 
protected by sHFWLRQG$FFRUGLQJWRKLPµunder our existing system of industrial relations, 
effective constitutional protection of the associational interests of employees in the collective 
bargaining process require concomitant protection of their freedom to withdraw collectively their 
services subject to section 1 of the Charter¶.36 He did not consider the right to strike independent 
of its connection with collective bargaining. Moreover, in determining whether the legislation 
constituted a justified and proportionate limitation on a constitutional right, Dickson C.J. was 
very GHIHUHQWLDORIWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VSROLF\REMHFWLYHVDQGPHDQV2QO\WKHDEVROXWHSURKLELWLRQ
                                                     
32
 Ibid., 249-50.  
33
 Ibid., 355-58. 
34
 Ibid., 359. 
35
 Ibid., 371. In his section 1 analysis in each of the cases in the Labour Trilogy, Dickson C.J.C. was very 
defereQWLDOWRWKHJRYHUQPHQWVLQXSKROGLQJWKHOLPLWDWLRQVRQWKHXQLRQ¶VIUHHGRPRIDVVRFLDWLRQ:LOVRQ
J. adopted a less deferential stance in both PSAC and RWDSU. 
36Ibid.,  371.  
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on strikes by public sector workers, which had already been found to be contrary to Convention 
E\WKH,/2¶V&ommittee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations 
(CEACR), did not survive constitutional scrutiny.37 
  )RUWKHQH[WIRXUWHHQ\HDUV-XVWLFH0F,QW\UH¶VDSSURDFKWRLQWHUSUHWLQJWKHVFRSHRIWKH
Charter¶VSURWHFWLRQRIIUHHGRPRIDVVRFLDWLRQZKLFKOLPLWHGFRQVWLWXWLRQDOSURWHFWLRQWRWKRVH
associational activities that only an individual could do lawfully, prevailed. During this time, the 
majority of the members of the Court also ignored international law pertaining to the right to 
strike and to bargain collectively. In three subsequent cases, the Supreme Court of Canada 
affirmed that freedom of association did not include the right to strike or the right to bargain 
collectively.38  
 Despite his failure in the short term WRµDWWUDFWVXIILFLHQWFROOHJLDOVXSSRUWWROLIWKLVYLHZV
RXWRIWKHLUGLVVHQWLQJVWDWXV¶in the longer term Dickson C.J.¶V DSSURDFKWR&DQDGD¶V
commitments under international law SURYHGµWREHDPDJQHWLFJXLGH¶39 Its pull was first felt in 
2001 when the Supreme Court of Canada invoked Dickson C.J.¶VGLVVHQWDVWKHLQVSLUDWLRQIRU
relying on international labour law and human rights for the interpretation of freedom of 
association in the labour context. In its incremental expansion of the scope of freedom of 
association to include such collective activities as making collective representations to an 
employer, the Court referred to international human rights and the observations of ILO 
supervisory bodies as interpretive sources.40 Yet, GHVSLWHH[SOLFLWUHIHUHQFHWRWKH,/2¶V 
&RPPLWWHHRQ)UHHGRPRI$VVRFLDWLRQ¶VREVHUYDWLRQWKDWWKHH[FOXVLRQRIDJULFXOWXUDOZRUNHUV
from FROOHFWLYHEDUJDLQLQJZDVLQYLRODWLRQRI&DQDGD¶VREOLJDWLRQVXQGHU&RQYHQWLRQWKH
Court did not extend its interpretation of freedom of association to include collective 
bargaining.41 
                                                     
37
 Alberta Reference, 375, citing Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining: General Survey by 
the Committee of Experts in the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, Report III (Part 4B), 
ILO Geneva, 1983. 
38
 In ,QWHUQDWLRQDO/RQJVKRUHPHQ¶VDQG:DUHKRXVHPHQ¶V Union ² Canada Area Local 500 v. Canada, 
[1994] S.C.J. No. 11, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 150 (S.C.C.); Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada 
v. Northwest Territories (Commissioner), [1990] S.C.J. No. 75, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 367 (S.C.C.); Delisle v. 
Canada (Deputy Attorney General), [1999] S.C.J. No. 43, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 989 (S.C.C). 
39
 SFL, para. 63.  
40
 Dunmore, para. 41.  
41
 Ibid., para 41. 
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 In 2007, the Supreme Court overturned the precedent established 20 years earlier in the 
Labour Trilogy that collective bargaining was not protected by freedom of association. The 
majority decision in Health Services, which was written by McLachlin CJ and Le Bel J, 
characterized Dunmore as marking a new direction in freedom of association jurisprudence and 
expanded the activities protected under freedom of association to include aspects of collective 
bargaining, specifically the duty to bargain in good faith. The Court referred to history, 
international law, and Charter values to justify the expansion of constitutionally protected 
associational activities to include the right to strike.42 Moreover, the Court adopted the position 
staked out by Dickson CJ in his dissent in the Alberta Reference to international human rights 
instruments that Canada has ratified; although not binding, they provide an important normative 
resource for interpreting the Charter¶s freedom of association guarantee.43 The Court also noted 
WKH,/2¶VWKUHHPDLQVXSHUYLVRU\ bodies, the CFA, the CEACR, and the Commission of Inquiry, 
had interpreted Convention 87 to include collective bargaining.44 But, in light of the wide range 
of international legal sources to which it referred, it is striking that the Court omitted any 
reference to the recommendations of the CFA regarding the legislation in dispute. Equally 
remarkable is just how limited the right to collective bargaining that the Court considered to be 
protected by the Charter and the extent to which it departed from the understandings of the ILO 
supervisory bodies.45 It also specifically mentioned that the case did not involve the right to 
strike, which had been considered in the Labour Trilogy.46 
 The consensus over the evolutionary expansion of freedom of association to include 
ZRUNHUV¶FROOHFWLYHULJKWVDQGDFRQWH[WXDODSSURDFKZDVDEUXSWO\EURNHQLQWKHGHFLVLRQ
Fraser v. Ontario (Attorney General).47The extent of disagreement amongst members of the 
Court over the scope of collective bargaining influenced the tone and cogency of the reasoning in 
Fraser. Despite the fact that there was only a lone dissent, the judges who agreed that the 
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legislation was constitutional were deeply divided over the scope of the constitutionally 
protected freedom of association in the labour relations context, and they issued three separate 
sets of reasons. 
 A large part (48 paragraphs out of a judgment that is 118 paragraphs long) of the majority 
judgment in Fraser, which was written by McLachlin C.J. and LeBel J., who were also the 
authors of the majority decision in Health Services, was taken up by a defence of the majority 
judgment in Health Services as a legally valid and binding precedent. They were responding to 
Rothstein J.¶VFRQFXUULQJGHFLVLRQZKLFK advocated that Health Services be overturned. Thus, 
their use of international labour law in Fraser was purely defensive, since Justice Rothstein also 
TXHVWLRQHGWKHYDOLGLW\RIWKHPDMRULW\¶VKDQGOLQJRILQWHUQDWLRQDOODERXUODZTKHPDMRULW\¶V
decision LJQRUHGWKH&)$¶VLQWHULPREVHUYDWLRQVUHJDUGLQJWKHwhether the complained of 
legislation conformed to the principles of freedom of association.48 Moreover, it appeared that 
Fraser marked the end of the incremental expansion of the scope of freedom of association in the 
labour context that began with Dunmore. The majority DSSHDUHGWRVXEVWLWXWHµimpossibility¶IRU
µsubstantial LQWHUIHUHQFH¶DVWKHVWDQGDUGWRmeet in establishing an interference with the exercise 
of the freedom of association.49 It also emphasised that Health Services did not constitutionalise 
the prevailing model of collective bargaining in Canada.50  
 However, Mounted Police Association of Ontario v. Canada (MPAO), which was 
released two weeks before SFL, signalled that Fraser marked a hiatus in, and not a halt to, the 
incremental expansion of the scope of protection provided by freedom of association in the 
Charter.51 The Supreme Court of Canada made it clear that the test of whether or not the 
constitutionally protected right to bargain collectively had been violated was substantial 
interference. It went on to declare that freedom of association protects the µULJKWRIHPSOR\HHVWR
associate for the purpose of meaningfully pursuing collective workplace goals¶ and that a 
µPHDQLQJIXOSURFHVVRIFROOHFWLYHEDUJDLQLQJLVDSURFHVVWKDWSURYLGHVHPSOR\HHVZLWKDGHJUHH
of choice and independence sufficient to enable them to determine their collective interests and 
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PHDQLQJIXOO\SXUVXHWKHP¶52 Thus, the question the Court had to resolve in the SFL case was 
whether or not strike action was an essential part of collective bargaining.  
 
4. The Tipping Point: Constitutional Protection for the Right to Strike  
 Justice Abella began her analysis of whether or not it was appropriate to depart from the 
precedent of the Labour Trilogy holding that the right to strike was not part of the of the 
activities constitXWLRQDOSURWHFWHGXQGHUWKH&KDUWHU¶VSURWHFWLRQRIIUHHGRPRIDVVRFLDWLRQE\
noting that the Supreme &RXUW¶VDSSURDFKWRWKHinterpretation of freedom of association had 
changed since the labour Tribology was decided. She pointed out that in MPAO the majority of 
WKH6XSUHPH&RXUWµFRQILUPHGWKDWIUHHGRPRIDVVRFLDWLRQ VHHNVWRSUHVHUYH³employee 
DXWRQRP\DJDLQVWWKHVXSHULRUSRZHURIPDQDJHPHQW´LQRUGHUWRDOORZIRUDPHDQLQJIXOSURFHVV
RIFROOHFWLYHEDUJDLQLQJ¶53 She therefore concluded that in light of the fundamental shift in the 
scope of the freedom of association jurisprudence since the Alberta Reference was decided, µthe 
trial judge was entitled to depart from precedent and consider the issue in accordance with the 
Court¶VUHYLWDlised interpretatLRQRIVG¶54 6KHWKHQWXUQHGWR'LFNVRQ&-&¶VGLVVHQWLQ
Alberta ReferenceZKLFKVRZHGWKHVHHGVRIWKHµJHQHURXVDSSURDFK¶WRWKHIUHHGRPRI
association jurisprudence, to emphasise WKDWKHFRQFOXGHGWKDWµ³HIIHFWLYHFRQVWLWXWLRQDO




specificities of the dominant legislative approach to protecting collective bargaining in Canada, 
which has come to be known as a Wagner-Style model.56 In both Health Services and Fraser, the 
Supreme Court of Canada made it very clear that freedom of association does not mandate a 
particular legislative scheme of collective bargaining.57 For this reason, Abella J. referred to 
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academic articles and books concerning the historical role of strikes in furthering collective 
bargaining to support her conclusion that  
 While strike action has variously been the subject of legal protections and prohibitions, 
 the ability of employees to withdraw their labour in concern has long been essential to 
 meaningful collective bargaining. Protection under s. 2(d), however, does not depend 
 solely or primarily on the historical/legal pedigree of the right to strike. Rather, the right 
 to strike is constitutionally protected because of its crucial role in a meaningful process 
 of collective bargaining.58  
She also UHIHUUHGWR&DQDGD¶VLQWHUQDWLRQDOREOLJDWLRQV59 the emerging international consensus 
on the right to strike, 60 and Charter values61 to support her conclusion µWKDWDPHDQLQJIXOSURFHVV 
of collective bargaining requires the ability of employees to participate in the collective 
withdrawal of services for the purpose of pursuing the terms and conditions of their employment 
though a collective agreement.62 6KHUHMHFWHGWKHGLVVHQWLQJMXGJHV¶ claim that the Court should 
defer to the legislature in interpreting the scope of the constitutional protection of the freedom of 
association, stating instead that rights should be interpreted generously and that deference to 
legislative choices only plays a role in determining whether the limitation of the Charter-
protected right is proportionate.63  
 Justice Abella formulated the test for determining whether the &KDUWHU¶VSURWHFWLRQRI
freedom of association has been violated aVµwhether the legislative interference with the right to 
strike in a particular case amounts to a substantial interference with collective bargaining.¶64 She 
FRQFOXGHGWKDWWKH36(6$µGHPRQVWUDEO\PHHWVWKLVWKUHVKROGVLQFHLWSUHYHQWVGHVLJQDWHG
employees from engaging in any work VWRSSDJHDVSDUWRIWKHEDUJDLQLQJSURFHVV¶65 Thus, the 
onus shifted to the government to justify the interference with the right to strike under section 1, 
which imposes a strict proportionality test. While Abella J. DFFHSWHGWKDWµWKHPDLQWHQDQFHRI
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essential services is self-HYLGHQWO\DSUHVVLQJDQGVXEVWDQWLDOREMHFWLYH¶DQGWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶V
objective in introducing the PSESA was rationally connected to it, she held that the provincial 
government had failed to establish that the means that it adopted to achieve this goal were  
µPLQLPDOO\LPSDLULQJ¶RIWKHFRQVWLWXWLRQDOULJKW66 In light of µthe breadth of the essential 
services that the employer is entitled to designate unilaterally without an independent review 
SURFHVV¶DQGµWKHDEVHQFHRIDQDGHTXDWHimpartial and effective alternative mechanism for 
resolving collectivHEDUJDLQLQJLPSDVVHV¶VKH concluded that the PSESA impairs the freedom of 
DVVRFLDWLRQULJKWVµRIGHVLJQDWHGHPSOR\HHVPXFKPRUHZLGHO\DQGGHHSO\WKDQLVQHFHVVDU\WR
achieve its objectiYHRIHQVXULQJWKHFRQWLQXHGGHOLYHU\RIHVVHQWLDOVHUYLFH¶67 
  
5. The Breadth of the Arc of Workplace Justice: The Implications of SFL 
 SFL confirms WKH6XSUHPH&RXUWRI&DQDGD¶Vgenerous approach to the interpretation of 
the freedom of association and its practice of gradually expanding the scope of protected 
activities in the labour context. It is also a clear rejection of 5RWKVWHLQ-¶VLQGLYLGXDOLVWDQG
deferential approach to the interpretation of the scope of constitutionally protected associational 
activities, as well as to his understanding of the role and content of international labour law. 
+RZHYHULWLVLPSRUWDQWWRORRNEHQHDWKWKH&RXUW¶VHYRFDWLYHUKHWRULFDQGEURDGVWDWHPHQWVWR
consider the some implications of the decision. In this section, we focus on what the role of 
international law in interpreting the scope of constitutionally protected freedom of association, 
whether or not the right to strike is tethered to the collective bargaining, and the constitutionality 
of the SaskatchewaQ¶VUHYLVHGHVVHQWLDOVHUYLFHVOHJLVODWLRQ 
 
i) The Role of International Labour Rights  
 Initially, the role of international law in general and international labour rights in 
particular in interpreting the scope of protection provided by the Charter¶VJXDUDQWHHto freedom 
of association was controversial.68 The Canadian constitution, unlike the constitution of South 
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Africa, for example, does not refer to international law.69 Canada adopts what is known as a 
dualist approach to international law, which means that in order to have legal effect within 
Canada an international treaty obligation must incorporated within domestic legislation.70 
However, this dualist approach WRµWKHGRPHVWLFLPSOLFDWLRQVRILQWHUQDWLRQDOODZKDVJUDGXDOO\
but steadily been replaced by a much more relational understanding of the boundary between the 
international and national legal spheres.¶71 A prime example of this shift in approach is Dickson 
&-¶Vdissent in the Alberta Reference, where he set out what has since come to be the Supreme 
&RXUW¶VSUHYDLOLQJDSSURDFKWRLQWHUQDWLRQDOOHJDOQRUPVDQGinstruments that Canada has 
ratified, which is that they will be used as resource for interpreting the scope of rights and 
freedoms protected under the Canadian Charter.72  
 Justice Abella affirmed this approach in SFL. Referring to Dickson C.J.¶VGLVVHQWLQWKH
Alberta Reference, she asserted that &DQDGD¶VLQWHUQDWLRQDOKXPDQULJKWVREOLJDWLRQVDOVR 
mandate protecting the right to strike as part of a meaningful process of collective bargaining.73  
She referred to the explicit protections of the right to strike in the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and the Charter of the Organization of American States; 
the non-binding, but persuasive, decisions of the ILO supervisory bodies that freedom of 
association includes the right to strike; and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, which incorporates Convention No. 87 and the obligations it sets out.74   
 This affirmation was especially important in light of the controversy at the ILO over the 
status of the right to strike DQGWKHDXWKRULW\RIWKH,/2¶V Committee of Experts. In June 2012, 
the International Organization of Employers (IOE), one of the three constituents of the ILO 
(along ZLWK0HPEHU6WDWHVDQGWKH:RUNHUV¶*URXSLQWHUUXSWHGWKHXVXDOSURFHHGLQJVRIWKH 
annual International Labour Conference, to challenge the right to strike.75 Although this 
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challenge was not unprecedented ± since 1989 the IOE has regularly voiced opposition to the 
right to strike ± it was the most dramatic.76 The employer group refused to examine any case of 
serious non-compliance involving Convention 87 in the Tripartite Committee on the Application 
of Standard (CAS), which examines the reports of the Committee of Experts. The IEO claimed, 
correctly, that the right to strike is not expressly protected in Convention 87 on Freedom of 
Association,77 DQGIXUWKHUDQGPRUHFRQWURYHUVLDOO\WKDWWKH,/2¶V&RPPLWWHHRI Experts, which 
interpreted freedom of association as including by necessary implication the right to strike, does 
not have the legal mandate to interpret conventions.78 In February 2015, a tripartite meeting 
convened by the ILO¶V*RYHUQLQJ%RG\QHJRWLDWHGa temporary solution to the three-year 
impasse over the right to strike. $OWKRXJKWKHDJUHHPHQWEHJLQVZLWKWKHVWDWHPHQWWKDWµWKHULJKW
to take industrial action by workers and employers in support of their legitimate industrial 
interest is recognized by the constituents of the International Labour 2UJDQL]DWLRQ¶LWGHIHUVWKH
sticky jurisdictional question about the capacity of different supervisory bodies to issue 
observations about the right to strike to future negotiations.79   
 What is remarkable is that the SFL majority decision simply ignored the employer 
JURXS¶VFODLPWKDWWKHULJKWWRVWULNHLVQRWSDUWRIWKH,/2¶VDFTXLV7KLVDSSURDFKLVLQPDUNHG
contrast to that adopted in the dissenting judgment, where Rothstein J claimed the µFXUUHQWVWDWH
of international law on the right to strike in XQFOHDU¶80 Moreover, the SFL decision should put an 
end to the objections raised by &DQDGLDQHPSOR\HUV¶UHSUHVHQWDWLYHWo the ILO µWKDWLWZRXOGEH
entirely inappropriate¶IRUWKH&($5µto conclude that the carefully tailored restrictions on the 
strike activity, as adopted by democratically elected legislatures and consistently reaffirmed by 
independent FRXUWVYLRODWHGD³ULJKWWRVWULNH´¶81 Now that the Supreme Court of Canada has 
affirmed that freedom of association protects the right to strike it is unlikely that Canadian 
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employers will continue to prefer national approaches to interpreting the right to strike over those 
of the CEACR.  
 Although Justice Abella relied on international law, including ILO conventions, as a 
normative source for interpreting the constitutional guarantee of freedom of association, she 
made no reference to the observations of the CFA or CEACR that the legislation the 
constitutionality of which was before the Court violated the principles of freedom of 
association.82 7KHPDMRULW\¶VWUHDWPHQWRI,/2norms in SFL is consistent with its previous 
practice of invoking the international labour rights that Canada has ratified to justify a change in 
the general direction of the jurisprudence. But, while the Court refers to international labour and 
human rights instruments and their interpretation by ILO supervisory bodies in order to give 
meaning to the freedom of association, at the same time it ignores the observations of those 
bodies regarding the specific legislation whose constitutionality is before it.83 This technique 
allows the Court to preserve its exclusive jurisdiction, which is to determine the constitutionality 
of legislation or government action that is brought before it for scrutiny, instead of de facto 
delegating this role to ILO supervisory bodies by simply adopting their decisions. It also enabled 
the Court on two occasions to ignore the observations of ILO supervisory bodies that the specific 
collective bargaining OHJLVODWLRQXQGHUUHYLHZGLGQRWFRQILUPWRWKH,/2¶IUHHGRPRIDVVRFLDWLRQ
norms when ruling that the impugned legislation was constitutional.84 
 
ii) Tethering the Scope of the Right to Strike to Collective Bargaining?  
 Like the courts below and Dickson C.J.C.¶V dissent in the Alberta Reference, the Supreme 
Court¶s definition of the right to strike in SFL was tightly tied to collective bargaining between 
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unions and employers.85 The Court emphasised that striking is recognized as a protected right 
because of its µunique role in the collective bargaining process¶ and a means by which workers 
acting together through their union µexert meaningful influence over their working conditions 
through a process of collective bargaining.¶86 In fact, the Court framed the question for 
determining whether limits on strikes violate freedom of association as µwhether the legislative 
interference with the right to strike in a particular case amounts to a substantial interference with 
collective bargaining.¶87 On a narrow reading, it appears that the Court conceived of the strike as 
a component of collective bargaining, rather than as a direct form of associative activity itself. 
 However, tKH&RXUW¶VFRQFHSWLRQRIDVWULNHDVDFROOHFWLYHZLWKGUDZDORIODERXULQ
support of collective bargaining processes to reach a collective agreement with an employer 
setting terms and conditions of employment should not necessarily be interpreted as an 
exhaustive statement of the protection for strike activity afforded by the Canadian Charter. The 
legislation in question authorised employers to prohibit strikes in order to resolve a bargaining 
impasse in connection with negotiating collective agreement negotiations in essential services 
and this constituted the factual matrix before the Court. It is important to recall that the Court has 
warned against determining the full scope of Charter rights in the absence of a factual 
foundation.88 The constitutional status of other species of collective work stoppages taken in 
pursuit of goals not connected to the terms and conditions of employment was not before the 
Court and is, therefore, an open question.   
 Moreover, JXVWLFH$EHOOD¶V reasoning does not foreclose future arguments that freedom of 
association protects strikes or collective protests outside of the collective bargaining context.  
Although she did not address collective work stoppages for other purposes or broader political 
protest, Abella J. explained the rationale for Charter protection of freedom of association as a 
means of protecting the essential needs and interests of working people.89 In her general 
comments about the purpose of providing constitutional protection of freedom of association she 
referred to both Health Services and MPAO, which emphasised the goals of respecting the 
autonomy of a person, enhancing democracy, and protecting the individual µfrom state enforced 
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isolation in the pursuit of his or hHUHQGV¶.90 Referring to MPAO, she recognized that freedom of 
association helps groups work to right imbalances in society and makes possible more equal 
society.91 6KHDOVRGLVPLVVHGWKHGLVVHQWLQJMXGJHV¶FRQFHUQWKDWFRQVWLWXWLRQDOSURWHFWLRQIRUWKH
right to strike ignores the interests RIHPSOR\HUVLQHVWDEOLVKLQJµWUXHZRUNSODFHMXVWLFH¶RQWKH
ground that they attribute a false equivalence between the power of employees and employers.92 
7KXVWKHPDMRULW\¶VDQDO\VLVSURYLGHVDEDVLVIRUORRVHQLQJWKHWLHEHWZHHQWKHULJKWWRVWULNHDQG
collective bargaining. 
 7KH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VDSSURDFKWRLQWHUSUHWLQJWKHVFRSHRIODERXU-related activities 
SURWHFWHGE\WKH&KDUWHU¶VJXDUDQWHHRIIUHHGRPRIDVVRFLDWHalso provides a basis for expanding 
the right to strike beyond the narrow confines of collective bargaining. The Court has repeatedly 
DVVHUWHGWKDWIUHHGRPRIDVVRFLDWLRQGRHVQRWµFRQVWLWXWLRQDOLVH¶DVSHFLILFOHJLVODWLYHPRGHORI
collective bargaining and since Dunmore, which was decided in 2001, and it has consistently 
referred to the ILO norms that Canada has ratified in interpreting the scope of freedom of 
association.    
 Even within the labour relations FRQWH[WWKH&RXUW¶V definition of strike activity in SFL is 
narrowly framed. Locating the right to strike as a component of collective bargaining fits neatly 
into the dominant Canadian model of statutory regulation of labour relations. In the Canadian 
legislative context, the right to strike is predicated on having legally-recognised associations who 
assert the right.93 However, conceptualised more broadly within the labour relations context and 
not linked to any particular statutory regime, a strike can be thought of as the engine that propels 
several aspects of employees acting together in pursuit of common workplace goals. As the trial 
judge in the SFL case recognized, µfrom the perspective of Charter interpretation, it is important 
to recall that workers have not needed any particular statutory definition, nor any particular 
statutory ³regime´, nor indeed any statute at all, to refuse to work in concert with one another in 
order to achieve collective goals.¶94 Labour legislation in Canada did not create strike activity but 
instead, curtailed strikes in support of union recognition, contract negotiations, contract 
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enforcement, and other goals.95 Since Health Services, the Supreme Court has taken great pains 
to emphasise that freedom of association does not µconstitutionalise¶Dparticular legislative 
collective bargaining regime.96 Thus, it is conceivable that in the absence of a legislative 
mechanism that compels an employer to bargain with a trade union that represents its employees, 
any governmental restrictions on the right of employees to strike in order to induce their 
employer to recognise their bargaining representative would constitute a violation of the right to 
strike that would have to be justified as proportionate. The rights of individuals who do not 
succeed in forming a union with legal recognition as the exclusive bargaining agent of the 
employees or the rights of individuals to work together to advance their interests outside of or 
beyond what can be achieved through the union as an institution are not contemplated, but also 
QRWH[FOXGHGLQWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VFRQFHSWXDOL]DWLRQRIWKHULJKWWRVWULNHLQSFL. 
 Moreover, the Court has consistently resorted to the general surveys and digests of 
RSLQLRQVRIWKH,/2¶VVXSHUYLVRU\ERGLHVWKH&($5DQG&)$WRLQWHUSUHWWKHIUHHGRPRI
association in the labour relations context. Neither the CEAR nor the CFA have restricted the 
right to strike to collective bargaining. According to the CEAR, the right to strike is an essential 
and intrinsic element of the activities set out in Article 3 of Convention 87, which Canada has 
ratified:  
 The right to strike is one of the essential means available to workers and their 
 organisations for the promotion and protection of their economic and social interest. 
These  interests not only have to do with better working conditions and pursuing collective 
 demands of an occupation nature, but also with seeking solutions to economic and social 
 policy questions and to labour problems of any kind which are of direct concern to the 
 workers.97  
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protected by Convention No. 87¶98 If the Supreme Court follows its now well-established 
practice of interpreting the scope of constitutionally protected freedom of association in light 
with the international obligation that Canada has voluntarily undertaken, the link between the 
right to strike and collective bargaining is not necessary in order to provide protection for strikes 
for workers and their representatives who are pursuing concerns of direct interest to workers.  
 
c) The Constitutionality RI6DVNDWFKHZDQ¶V1HZ(VVHQWLDO6HUYLFHV/HJLVODWLRQ 
 In what has become a routine practice when the Supreme Court of Canada finds 
legislation violates the rights and freedoms guaranteed in the Canadian Charter, it suspended its 
declaration of invalidity for 12 months, thus allowing the PSESA to remain in place while the 
government formulated its response. In the immediate aftermath of the decision6DVNDWFKHZDQ¶V
Premier mused publically about using the notwithstanding clause of the Charter, which allows a 
government to enact or continue a law in spite of the fact that it violates a Charter-protected 
fundamental freedom for renewable five year terms. However, on October 15, 2015, the 
government introduced new essential services legislation, which it claimed addresses the 
concerns raised by the Supreme Court of Canada.99  
 The revised legislation does not define the term µessential services¶, and uses a broad 
definition of µpublic employer¶, and therefore potentially applies to a broad range of collective 
bargaining relationships. It also continues to require employers and employees to negotiate what 
essential services will be maintained during a work stoppage, but provides for an essential 
services tribunal to determine issues in the event the parties cannot agree. This tribunal has 
broader powers to decide µessential services¶ that must be maintained and the job classifications 
required to maintain essential services. The legislation builds on and extends lengthy notice 
periods and procedural steps before legal strike action can be taken. Where an essential services 
agreement or tribunal decision requires so many employees to continue working during a strike 
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or lockout as to creates a substantial interference with the work stoppage, the new legislation 
requires interest arbitration to set the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. If the parties 
cannot agree on an interest arbitrator, the government appoints the arbitrator, who must consider 
a range of factors in determining the terms of the collective agreement, including the wages of 
unionized and non-unionized employees in the public and private sectors, opportunities for 
employment, and the general economic conditions of the province.100  
 The lack of dHILQLWLRQRIµHVVHQWLDOVHUYLFH¶the delays imposed before workers can elect 
to go on strike, the role of government in appointing the interest arbitrator, and the list of 
mandatory considerations that the arbitrator must consider raise real concerns about whether 
6DVNDWFKHZDQ¶Vnew essential services legislation provides for the kind of impartial and effective 
dispute resolution process required to compensate for the loss of the right to strike.101 In SFL, 
Justice Abella called for clearly demarcated limits on what services qualify as essential, adopting 
WKH,/2GHILQLWLRQRIµVHUYLFHVZKRVHLQWHUUXSWLRQZRXOGHQGDQJHUWKHOLIHSHUVRQDOVDIHW\RU
KHDOWKRIWKHZKROHRUSDUWRIWKHSRSXODWLRQ¶DVWKHSURSHUOLPLWRQWKHW\SHRIVHUYLFHVWKDW
would justify abrogating the right to strike.102 :KHWKHURUQRWWKHOHJLVODWLRQ¶VIDLOXUHWRGHILQH
µHVVHQWLDOVHUYLFHV¶SURYHVWREHDQLQWHUIHUHQFHZLWKWKHULJKWWRVWULNHwill depend upon how the 
essential services tribunal interprets the term.  
 Where maintaining essential services does prevent a strike, the Court was clear that in 
order for the interference with the Charter-protected right to strike to be considered 
proportionate, an adequate, impartial and effective alternative mechanism for resolving collective 
bargaining impasses must be provided.103 7KLVUHTXLUHPHQWLVVLPLODUWRWKHSRVLWLRQRIWKH,/2¶V
supervisory bodies, which have stated any arbitration system should be impartial, speedy, and 
permit the parties concerned to take part at every stage. As well, the arbitration system should 
have the confidence of both sides and its outcomes should not be predetermined by legislative 
criteria.104  
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 However, under the new essential services legislation, the government appoints the 
interest arbitrator despite the fact that it has become common practice in some public sector 
collective bargaining for government representatives to sit at the bargaining table as observers. 
Thus, the legislation does not provide assurance of institutional or structural impartiality in 
interest arbitration process and it requires the arbitrator to consider a range of factors that benefit 
the public employers and not the public sector workers.105   
 Despite the obvious shortcoming with the new essential services legislation, any union 
challenging it will have to establish clear evidence that the government would fail to act with 
impartiality in its appointments.106 Even more significantly, any constitutional challenge to the 




6. Conclusion  
 The Supreme Court oI&DQDGD¶VULQJLQJHQGRUVHPHQWWKDWWKHULJKWWRVWULNHLVDIRUPRI
FRQVWLWXWLRQDOO\SURWHFWHGIUHHGRPRIDVVRFLDWLRQLVWKHFXOPLQDWLRQRIWKH&RXUW¶VJHQHURXV
approach to the interpretation of the Canadian Charter in the labour context. It also gives a boost 
to the private and public sector unions which brought constitutional challenges to legislation 
enacted by the former Conservative federal government that severely restricted their right to 
strike.108 Constitutional review of legislation by judges could legitimately be used to foster 
democratic deliberation and to ensure that any restrictions on labour rights are proportionate to 
the goals and means that governments have chosen. It could also be used to ensure that 
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governments live up to their international human rights commitments to provide freedom of 
association for all workers. 
 However, constitutional protection of the right to strike will not solve the problem of 
organisHGODERXU¶VVORZGHFOLQHLQ&DQDGD, where we have seen the incidence of strike drop over 
the past twenty years.109 In Workers: Worlds of Labour, the historian Eric Hobsbawm claimed 
that human rights are the natural language of groups who are excluded and oppressed.110 They 
are moral aspirations that inspire protest movements, and the goal is to change the social 
consensus so that labour rights become political agreements that are legally enforceable. 
However, labour rights need a social force, typically a social movement, behind them to give 
them a progressive social meaning; favourable Court decisions are not enough.  Industrial 
capitalism generated a ready-made constituency and political basis for resistance to the 
commodification RIZRUNHUV¶OLYHV. Industrial Unions were the institutions that made the 
declarations of labour rights contained in international human rights instruments and national 
constitutions effective. Labour law is, as Bob Hepple reminded XVµWKHRXWFRPHRIVWUXJJOHV
between different social actors and ideolRJLHVRISRZHUUHODWLRQVKLSV¶111 The open question is 
whether strikes can become a catalyst for, and expression of, a new rejuvenated labour 
movement, one which is able to develop new techniques to take on corporate retail and fast-food 
giants such as Wal-Mart and McDonald.112 
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